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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
.\~D DEPOT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
~TATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF urrAH, 
Defendant. 
Case 
No.10025 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a sales and use tax deficiency 
assessment proposed against the Ogden Union Railway 
& Depot Company by the defendant for the period Octo-
ber 1, 1957 to September 30, 1961, in the total amount of 
s;j-t,OGS.0-1. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE STATE TAX 
CO~E\IISSION 
..:\. formal hearing was held before a lawfully consti-
tuted quorum of the State Tax Commission of Utah on 
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Friday, August 23, 1963, upon petition and notice as 
required by law. As a result of this hearing, the State 
Tax Commission sustained the deficiency assessment im-
posing the tax upon the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the sales and use tax de-
ficiency assessment, or, failing that, a reversal of that 
portion of the Tax Commission's decision imposing a 
sales tax upon certain services identified under Point III 
herein, and in addition plaintiff contests the imposition of 
interest on the deficiency, if upheld by this Court, from 
the date due until paid. 
Plaintiff also seeks a reversal of the use tax portion 
of the deficiency assessment upheld by the Tax Com-
mission relating to the consumption of coal by plaintiff 
in the direct operation of railroad revenue equipment 
belonging to the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific 
Railroads. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts herein are not in dispute. The Tax Com-
mission agrees with the plaintiff's statement, but in the 
interests of clarity and amplification submits the follow-
ing summary and additional facts. 
The plaintiff, the Ogden Union Railway & Depot 
Company, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Union Pacific 
and Southern Pacific, each of which owns one-half of its 
capital stock except for qualifying shares. Each of these 
railroad companies uses the plaintiff's terminal facilities 
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for their principal passenger and freight terminals at 
Ogden, Utah. The principal duty of the plaintiff is to 
inspPd, repair and clean all cars arriving at or leaving 
the h'rminal facilities in Union Pacific or Southern 
Pacific trains. 
These cars may belong to many foreign lines but 
are usually always in the possession of the Union Pacific 
or the Southern Pacific. The plaintiff provides cleaning 
mal otlll'r services for all such cars, but no billing is made 
to a foreign railroad not having possession of the cars. 
The line in possession thereafter bills the foreign line 
owllt>r for the services rendered to the particular car. 
( R. 42, 44-45) 
In the performance of these duties, plaintiff oper-
ates the Ogden Terminal; inspects railroad cars in pos-
session of its parent companies; performs light repairs 
thereon; sells hay, straw and sand to its parents in con-
nection with the cleaning and bedding of stock cars; and 
furnishes labor for washing, loading and unloading of 
grain doors, stenciling and other mechanical and clean-
ing SPITices. (R. 207-210) 
The ,·ehicles, tools and other facilities used to pro-
vide such serv-ices are either owned or leased by the 
Depot Company. (R. 36) 
The plaintiff was organized specifically to assist its 
parent companies, in duties required of them under fed-
eral law and Interstate Commerce Commission regu-
lations. 
In addition to sales and services rendered to its par-
ent companies, the plaintiff leases certain parts of its 
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facilities to independent third parties and receives re\'~ 
enue therefrom. In this regard plaintiff receives a per-
centage of the gross receipts of a snack bar, open to the 
public, located in the depot passenger building. (R. 36-37) 
Plaintiff also leases space to the U. S. Government 
for a railroad mail terminal and receives additional rev-
enue from locker rentals, telephones, and storage, switch-
ing and detention or demurrage of railroad cars. 
The total amount of income from these sources is 
used, pursuant to agreement with its parent companies, 
to reduce expenses charged to the parents for the opera-
tion and maintenance of the terminal. (R. 37) 
Only two railroads provide passenger and freight 
service to Ogden City. (R. 41) However, on occasion, 
another line may receive the benefit of the services and 
activities of the Depot Company. When this happens, a 
stipulated fee received for these services is used to re-
duce the net expense to the Union Pacific and Southern 
Pacific. (R. 30) Certain small amounts of income re-
ceived as rental payments are also used to reduce ex-
penses to the parent companies. (R. 30) 
The Tax Commission seeks to impose a tax upon 
all amounts paid or charged by plaintiff for: 
1. Sand, straw, hay and any other items of tangible 
personal property furnished to the Union Pa-
cific and Southern Pacific Railroads. 
2. Certain services involving repairs, renovations or 
installations of tangible personal property as pro-
vided in Section 59-15-4( e), U.C.A. 1953, as fully 
set forth hereafter. 
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3. Coal, purchased in Wyoming and used or con-
sumed by plaintiff in the production of heat at its 
heating plant in Ogden for the direct operation 
of revenue equipment belonging to the parent 
companies. 
In addition the Commission has contested the plain-
tiff's claim that interest cannot run from the time the 
taxes, in the form of an undertaking on appeal, were de-
posited with it; and has ordered, in the event its deci-
sion is upheld by this Court, that interest shall be due 
on the amount of such deficiency as may be upheld, from 
the date due until paid. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF, OGDEN UNION RAILWAY & 
DEPOT COMPANY, IS A RETAILER WITH-
IN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 59-15-2 (e), 
U.C.A.1953. 
That plaintiff is a retailer required to collect and pay 
~a lt)s taxes has never heretofore been subject to serious 
doubt. For at least 10 to 15 years prior to the audit, 
plaintiff has filed sales tax returns and collected and paid 
sales taxes on sales of sand and straw used for bedding, 
and hay used for feeding livestock, sold to the Union 
Pacific Company and the Southern Pacific Company. 
(R. 35) (R. 213) 
During the period of the audit deficiency, the plain-
tiff continuously had the sales tax license required by 
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Section 59-15-3, U.C.A. 1953, of all persons engaging in 
business in the State of Utah. 
The plaintiff contends that it is not a retailer for 
the following reasons : 
1. That it repairs and makes installations in be-
half of its parent companies and performs all services 
at cost and no profit whatsoever is involved. (Pl. Br. 
p. 16) 
2. That it is not engaged in a regularly organized 
retail business. Plaintiff contends that an examination of 
its organization as set forth in the stipulation of facts 
reveals a most irregular and unique type of business 
organization, hardly the type which one would consider 
in relation to the definition of a "regularly organized" 
retail business. (Pl. Br. p. 17) 
3. Plaintiff claims that it performs its entire serv-
ices for its parent companies and neither attempts to 
nor solicits such services for any third parties. It does 
no advertising and makes no solicitation of any kind to 
the public and that, therefore, it is not "known to the 
public'' as being engaged in a retail business of servic-
ing railroad equipment, or in fact any service business 
at all. (Pl. Br. p. 17) 
4. That the engaging in business in the customary 
sense means to voluntarily select an occupation or en-
deavor and to have control over the manner in which 
the activities or work of the business are to be carried 
out. Plaintiff claims that these elements are not present 
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in its current activities because it is required, pursuant 
to agreement, to meet the requirements of its parent com-
panics, and the parent companies in turn impose those 
requirements on plaintiff in order to comply with federal 
law and regulations. (Pl. Br. p. 18) 
Regarding plaintiff's contention that profit is neces-
sary before a tax can be imposed upon it, the Illinois case 
of Coufinental Can Co. v. Nudelma;n., 376 Ill. 446, 34 N.E. 
~d ;{!17 is significant. There, the plaintiffs were manu-
faduring and business enterprises operating lunchrooms 
at which food was sold at cost to their employees. The 
Court held that the sales of food to employees measured 
a tax, although apparently none of the plaintiffs made 
any sale at retail other than those sales to employees in 
the lunchroom. In that case, the primary activity of 
the taxpayers was not selling at retail, but the Court held 
that although the particular activity that measures the 
tax is incidental, and not conducted at a profit, that this 
does not bar the tax. 
A similar claim that profit was necessary in order 
to justify the imposition of a sales tax liability was 
made in the case of Trico Electric Cooperative v. State 
Ta.r Commission, 79 Ariz. 293, 288 P. 2d 782. The State 
Commission of Arizona there had levied an assessment 
against Trico Electric Cooperative for selling tangible 
personal property at retail. The tax was paid under 
protPst and suit brought to recover the same. The plain-
tiff was an electrical cooperative, selling electricity to 
its members only, constructing most of, and maintaining 
all of. its distribution lines, and to that end making pur-
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chases of large quantities of material. In making these 
purchases, often plaintiff estimated in excess of its needs. 
All purchases were made with the intention of using 
the same, but with the knowledge that a surplus might 
and probably would occur, and that in all probability it 
would be necessary in good business practice to dispose 
of such surplus. During the period involved, a surplus 
of various materials did occur and was sold to various 
companies and individuals for their respective consump-
tion and not for resale. The Arizona Supreme Court held 
that such sales constitute a separate business of selling 
at retail, which was taxable. The following language is 
pertinent: 
"While the aggregate of these materials were 
purchased for consumption to the extent there 
would be a need therefor, the excesses were bought 
with the knowledge that they might not and 
probably would not be consumed and with the 
expectation of selling at retail or cost whatever 
materials were not needed for consumption. This 
was a continuing practice and resulted in advan-
tages accruing to the plaintiff. By purchasing in 
carload lots, better prices were enjoyed. The 
sales were made with the object in view of secur-
ing these advtantages. To place one in the classifi-
cation of doing business as a retailer, it is not 
essential that the activity of selling at retail be 
done with the object of realizing a profit directly 
from the sales. It is sufficient if the object be any 
gain, benefit or advantage, direct or indirect." 
The Commission contends that the Depot Company 
is adequately compensated for the services or sales it 
makes on behalf of its parent companies. This compen-
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sation, which is received from direct charges to the par-
l)nt ~, is apparently adequate to maintain payrolls, pay 
depreciation, buy new equipment and in every way carry 
out the plaintiff's business purpose. The presence or ab-
~t>nre of additional monetary profit to plaintiff can hardly 
be dl'terminative of whether or not it is a retailer. 
Plaintiff next contends that it is not a retailer be-
cause of its irregular organization wherein it is con-
trolled by its parent companies. A similar claim was 
made on behalf of a Maine manufacturer and its wholly 
owned subsidiary. The Supreme Court of Main in the 
case of Bonnar-Vawter, Inc., v. Johnson, 157 Me. 380, 
173 A. 2d 141 (1961), spoke directly to both points- both 
this point and the issue of profit heretofore raised by 
plaintiff. In that case the taxpayer appealed from an 
assessment by the state tax assessor against Bonnar-
Vawter, Inc. for a use tax and penalty arising out of the 
use within the State of Maine of certain printing plates. 
The court set forth the facts substantially as follows : 
The plates are manufactured in New Hampshire by a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the plaintiff. The president, 
board of directors, and other officers are the same in the 
two companies. The two corporations maintain separate 
books of account and separate corporate balance state-
ments, and also file separate federal income tax returns. 
The employees engaged in the manufacture of the plates 
are employed by the subsidiary. When the plaintiff re-
rPin~s a printing order, it orders the plates from the sub-
sidiary, which then orders from various supply houses 
the raw materials to make them. The raw materials are 
shipped by the suppliers to the subsidiary. No agency 
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agreement existed between plaintiff and subsidiary in 
respect to the order for raw materials, and they are not 
purchased by the subsidiary as the disclosed agent of the 
plaintiff. When received, the materials are carried as 
items of inventory on the hooks of the subsidiary. The 
invoice when received is approved and is forwarded by 
the subsidiary to the plaintiff, who enters an account 
payable-trade on its books and then makes payment to 
the vendor and then enters an account receivable-Photo 
Plate on its books. Photo Plate, the subsidiary, enters 
an account payable-Bonnar-Vawter on its books. The 
raw materials are then converted into printing plates. 
Similar transactions are carried on the books of the 
various parties for accounts payable, accounts receivable, 
labor costs and other matters fully set forth in the option. 
The Court upheld the tax and stated, in referring to a 
claim that the subsidiary was not engaged in an activity 
with an object of gain, benefit or advantage, either direct 
or indirect : 
"It will be noted that the statute does not use 
the word 'profit.' The statute used the words 
'gain, benefit or advantage, either direct or indi-
rect.' These words have a broader meaning than 
that of the word profit. One may engage in a 
business activity with an object of gain, benefit or 
advantage and not necessarily for profit [citing 
cases]. 
''The gain, benefit or advantage may be large 
or small, direct or indirect. Although no profit 
was made by Photo Plate from its transaction 
with the appellant, it is not difficult to discover a 
direct or indirect gain, benefit, or advantage there-
from. The charges made by Photo Plate were 
10 
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madP to cover, in addition to the cost of labor and 
materials, 'overhead, depreciation, taxes, etc.' We 
must assume from the nature of the plates that 
Photo Plate was the owner of equipment neces-
sary in their production. This equipment was sub-
ject to depreciation. There was necessarily some 
overhead in the maintenance of the corporation . 
.. :\ pparently, there was a tax liability of some sort. 
The eharges made to the appellant and paid for by 
it, provided revenue to Photo Plate sufficient to 
cover its overhead, taxes, and depreciation, and 
thereby to that extent at least, Photo Plate bene-
fited from its transactions with the appellant. We 
must conclude that Photo Plate was engaged in 
an activity with the object of gain, benefit, or ad-
Yantage within the meaning of the word 'business' 
as defined in the statute. 
"Generally, courts have been reluctant to dis-
regard the legal entity of a corporation, and have 
done so with caution and only when necessary in 
the interest of justice. The corporate entity will 
be disregarded when used to cover fraud or ille-
gality or to justify a wrong. It will not be disre-
garded when to do so would promote an injustice, 
give an unfair advantage, or contravene public 
policy .... 
''In the :field of retail sales tax legislation and 
similar tax legislation, courts have generally re-
fused for various reasons to separate the corpora-
rate entities of the parent company and the wholly 
owned subsidiary in order to grant relief from 
such taxes at the expense of the state. See Su-
perior Coal Co. v. Department of Finance, 377, 
TIL 282, 36 N.E. 2d 354; Superior Coal Co. v. De-
partment of Revenue, 4 Ill. 2d 459, 123 N.E. 2d 
713: ~ orthwestern Pacific R. Co. v. State Board 
of Equalization, 21 Cal. 2d 524, 133 P. 2d 400; In 
11 
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Re Bush Terminal Co., 2 Cir., 93 F. 2d 661; Sim-
mons Hardware Co. v. City of St. Louis, 192 S.W. 
394; 64 A.L.R. 2d 769. 
''In the instant case, the appellant did not 
cause the plates to be manufactured by its own 
company. It elected to organize a subsidiary com-
pany to manufacture the plates. The reason for 
so doing was not disclosed by the stipulation. We 
must assume, however, that some economic advan-
tage resulted therefrom. A corporation ought not 
to be able to take whatever advantages are gained 
by maintaining a subsidiary as a separate entity, 
and at the same time cast aside that entity when-
ever it becomes a burden. We see no reason un-
der the circumstances of this case, for applying 
the rule that allows the corporate entity to be 
disregarded. '' 
Plaintiff's argument that it is not a retailer appears 
to be based in large measure upon that part of the Utah 
statutory definition providing that ''The term 'retailer' 
means a person doing a regularly organized retail busi-
ness in tangible personal property, known to the public 
as such ... " (emphasis supplied). See Section 59-15-2(e) 
U.C.A. 1953. 
The term "doing a regularly organized retail busi-
ness in tangible personal property" apparently does not 
contemplate the service activity carried on by the plain-
tiff. Rather, it contemplates a continuous and systematic 
course of sales activity involving the passage of title to 
personal property as contrasted with the isolated and 
occasional sales transactions which are exempt from tax. 
Because only a small portion of the tax liability 
proposed by the Tax Commission is based upon sales of 
12 
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tangible personal property, the question of whether or 
not plaintiff is doing a regularly organized retail business 
in tangible personal property, known to the public as 
such, loses much of its applicability in the present con-
troversy. 
Many retail businesses have a small or limited pub-
lic. The Tax Commission believes that no retail business 
C'stablishment in the State of Utah is known to the entire 
general public. A retail department store is known by 
a larger segment of the public than is a home barbershop 
or repair shop. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that both 
consider themselves a retailers and are treated as such 
by city and state taxing authorities. The size of the public 
segment served by a retailer cannot control the nature of 
the business operation unless so minimal as to constitute 
a sale, by a person who would otherwise be a retailer, 
an isolated and occasional sale. See Section 59-15-2 (e), 
U.C.A. 1953. 
The Tax Commission submits that where there is a 
regular and continuous course of rendering taxable sales 
or services that the requirement of being known to the 
public is satisfied when the retailers' activities are known 
to the particular element of the public which normally 
receives the benefit or end product of the general sales 
activity of the retailer. 
1Regarding the claim that plaintiff did not voluntar-
ily select nor control the activities sought to be taxed by 
the Commission and derives no profit therefrom, plain-
1 Much of the Tax Commission's response in this regard is derived from 
the unpublished decision of Wabash Rail-road Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, decided 
by the Supreme Court of Illinois, February 1, 1963. 
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tiff cites the case of Valier Coal Co. v. Department of 
Revewue, 11 Ill. 2d 402, 143 N.E. 2d 35 (1957). This 
case is the subject of an extensive annotation in 64 
A.L.R. 2d 769. 
As it involves the Illinois Retailers' occupation tax 
upon "persons engaged in the business of selling tangi-
ble personal property at retail ... " It should not con-
trol the disposition of this case where the tax is on 
every retail sale of tangible personal property and upon 
amounts paid and charged for certain services.2 
As far as the matter of duty is concerned, the Tax 
Commission thinks that the Depot Company unduly exag-
gerates both the element of compulsion and its legal 
significance. Whether the duty to repair the cars of 
other railroads results from an agreement among the rail-
roads themselves, or is imposed by federal law or regu-
lation apart from any contractual basis, is not controlling. 
In neither case is the plaintiff compelled to provide the 
services sought to be taxed, the obligation to make the 
repairs and provide the services in question is only a 
consequence of its decision to do so. The incidence of 
the tax depends upon the conduct involved, and not upon 
the influence that impels that conduct. The conduct here 
involved is the making of repairs, renovations and in-
stallations to tangible personal property and sales of such 
property, and that conduct falls within the statute. 
2 The Illinois tax is on the occupation and not on the sale. The act does 
not demand a tax unless the occupation to be taxed is selling personal property 
at retail. 
American Brake Shoe Co. V. Department of Revenue, 25 Ill. 2d 354, 185 
N. E. 2d 192. 
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Plaintiff argues that if it is not a "retailer" then 
sales by it to others which would otherwise be taxable 
are renden'd exempt. By making this contention plain-
tiff o\·Prlooks the fact that the sales tax in Utah is im-
posed not upon ''retailers'' but upon ''retail sales.'' 
~Petion 59-15-2 (e) defines the term retail sale as 
'' ('t'rry sale within the State of Utah by a retailer or 
wholesaler to a user or consumer, except such sales as are 
ddined as wholesale sales or otherwise exempted by 
the terms of this act . . . '' (Emphasis supplied). 
The Utah statute provides exemption for isolated 
and occasional sales and sales by certain agricultural 
producers. See 59-15-2(e). No sales of automobiles be-
tween private parties are exempt by reason of the iso-
lated and occasional sale exemption. It is apparent, how-
ever, that the private parties to a sale of an automobile 
are not ''retailers'' and under the interpretation of the 
act urged by plaintiff would owe no tax on such a sale. 
A similar argument was urged upon this Court in the 
case of Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax 
Commission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P. 2d 650 (1958). The 
Court there said : 
''As to the contention that the Sales Tax Act 
is applicable only to sales made by licensed retail-
ers, we disagree .... We believe the plain wording 
of the amendments clearly displays a legislative 
intent to tax all motor vehicle sales not exempted, 
irrespective of the vendor's personality or status, 
and did not mean to tax only sales of motor ve-
hicles by licensed retailers . . . '' 
15 
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Similarly, the Tax Commission submits that as the 
tax is upon every ''retail sale'' and as ''retail sale'' is 
every sale by a retailer or wholesaler except those sales 
otherwise exempted by the act, plaintiff's contention in 
effect reopens questions settled by the P.I.E. case, supra, 
and would eliminate the tax on the sale of an auto-
mobile by private parties. 
The Commission submits that the better rule is to 
tax all sales within the state except those otherwise 
exempt. In the case of sales the Utah statute provides 
taxation as the rule and exemption as the exception. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF, OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
& DEPOT COMPANY, IS REQUIRED TO COL-
LECT AND FORWARD SALES TAX ON TAX-
ABLE SERVICES RENDERED FOR OTHERS. 
Plaintiff, in its brief, argues that it is not a retailer 
doing a regularly organized retail business, known to 
the public as such. It then reasons that because it is not 
such a retailer it is not required to collect and forward 
sales tax on sales of taxable services to its parent 
companies. 
It agrees that some of the services it performs ''con-
stitute repairs, renovations or installations within the 
customary and ordinary meaning of those terms'' (Pl. 
Br. p. 6), but contends that if it is not a "retailer under 
the Sales Tax Act definition, it is outside the scope of 
16 
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hoth the sales tax on tangible personal property and the 
sales tax on services as well." (Pl. Br. p. 12) 
By this plea, plaintiff would negate the tax on all 
services. By definition a "retailer" is "a person doing 
a regularly organized retail business in tangible perso'YUJ,l 
propl'rfy .. . " (emphasis supplied). If a sale of tangible 
personal property by a service-oriented retail estab-
lishment is necessary before the service tax can be im-
posed, Section 59-15-4(e), U.C.A. 1953, is rendered mean-
ingless, and hundreds of thousands of dollars previously 
paid to the state3 have been collected erroneously. 
During the period of the controversy, as here before 
~tated, the plaintiff at all times was licensed as required 
by Section 59-15-3, U.C.A. 1953. The present language of 
the license statute dates from prior to 1939, when the 
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933, Section 3, required a 
license of "any wholesaler, retailer or proprietor ... " 
(emphasis supplied). In 1939 this language was changed 
by Chapter 103, Laws of 1939, to delete the words "re-
tailer or proprietor" and exact the license only of "per-
sons required by the provisions of this act to collect the 
tax.'' The 1939 amendment thus evidenced a legislative 
intention that persons other than retailers or proprietors 
could be required to collect the tax. 
The definition of ''retailer'' as provided by Section 
59-15-2 (e) has been in existence since the adoption of 
3 The collection of which, at least by implication, was approved by this 
Court in the following cases: Ft'ancom v. Utah State Tax Commission, 11 Utah 
2d 301, 356 P. 2d 285; Howe 11. State Tax Commission, 10 Utah 2d 362, 353 
P. 2d 468; Denvef' & Rio Gt'ande W estef'n R. R. Co. 11. State Tax Commission, 
11 Utah 2d 301, 358 P. 2d 352. 
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the Sales Tax Act. On the other hand, the services tax 
was adopted by Chapter 113 of the Laws of Utah 1959. 
Pertinent provisions of the current act provide: 
"59-15-4. ExmsE TAx - RATE - From and 
after the effective date of this act, there is levied 
and there shall be collected and paid : 
(a) A tax upon every retail sale of tangible 
personal property made within the State of 
Utah ... 
(e) A tax equivalent to 21j2 per cent of the 
amount paid or charged for all services for re-
pairs or renovations of tangible personal prop-
erty, or for installation of tangible personal prop-
erty rendered in connection with other tangible 
personal property.'' 
Thus, the present statute requires a sales tax to be 
levied and paid upon retail sales of tangible personal 
property, and also an independently levied tax to be paid 
upon transactions involving services for repairs or reno-
vations of tangible personal property. 
Section 59-15-5, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part: 
''Every person receiving any payment or con-
sideration upon a sale of property or service sub-
ject to the tax under the provisions of this act, or 
to whom such payment or consideration is payable 
(hereinafter called the vendor) shall be respon-
sible for the collection of the amount of the tax 
imposed on said sales ... '' 
Section 59-15-2 (e) defines ''person'' as : 
''any individual, firm, co-partnership, joint ad-
venture, corporation, estate or trust, or any 
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group or combination acting as a unit and the 
plural as well as the singular number, unless the 
intention to give a more limited meaning is dis-
closed by the context.'' 
It would appear, therefore, that the plaintiff is a 
statutory "person" and that, therefore, it is subject to 
the collection provision of Section 59-15-5, on a transac-
tion taxable by virtue of Section 59-15-4( e), and that 
whether or not it is a "retailer" is immaterial to its lia-
bility for the tax upon services. 
In the analogous case of Ford J. Twaits Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, the Tax Commis-
sion imposed a use tax liability upon contractors who 
purchased materials on their own account for construc-
tion of federal ordnance plants in Utah. The contractor 
contended in that case that the Utah Use Tax Act, Sec-
tion 80-16-2(j), provided that the retailer, as that term 
is used in the Act, was responsible for the collection of the 
tax, and when collected that it was a debt due from the 
retailer to the State. It further argued that it was not 
such a retailer. The contractors, however, could be in-
cluded under the term ''taxpayers,'' which was defined 
by Section 80-16-2 as : 
"every person storing, using or consuming tan-
gible personal property, the storage, use or con-
sumption of which is subject to the tax imposed 
by this act when such tax is not paid to a retailer." 
The U tab Supreme Court said : 
"Since it is not claimed that the contractors 
paid the ta:s: to the people from whom they made 
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these purchases, whether they were 'retailers' or 
not, they are included in the term 'taxpayer' as 
used here. 80-16-7 provides for making of returns 
and payments by 'every taxpayer.' As shown 
above, in this case the contractors are taxpayers.'' 
106 Utah 343, 347. 
So here, whether or not the plaintiff is a retailer is 
immaterial in view of the fact that it is a "person" re-
quired to collect tax on a series of transactions which 
are determined to be taxable by the Utah Code. 
Because of the fact that the majority of transactions 
subjected to tax by the defendant involve services ren-
dered and not sales of tangible personal property, the 
question of whether or not it is known to the public as 
operating such a retail business loses much of its applica-
bility to the present controversy. 
The Tax Commission submits that the Utah Sales 
Tax Act is intended to impose a sales tax on all taxable 
sales, exchanges of property, and services, and that 
unless the plaintiff falls within the provisions of some 
particular exemption statute that the sale of tangible 
personal property or rendering of services is subject 
to the tax. 
POINT III. 
SERVICES PERFORMED BY PLAINTIFF 
FOR ITS PARENT COMPANIES ARE TAX-
ABLE UNDER SECTION 59-15-4( e), U.C.A.1953, 
AS REPAIRS, RENOVATIONS OR INSTAL-
LATIONS OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY RENDERED IN CONNECTION WITH 
OTHER TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY. 
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The Commission concedes that Section 59-15-4 (e) 
doPs not impose a tax upon all services as contended by 
plaintiff in its brief. 
It is submitted, however, that if a certain service is 
taxable under this section it is not made less so by its 
in<'l us ion by plaintiff in a nonrepair account. The Tax 
Commtssion will not concede to the plaintiff or to the 
IntC'rstate Commerce Commission the power to deter-
mine the applicability of the Utah tax on services. 
The Commission does claim that the following serv-
ices are taxable : 
1. The cleaning of passenger cars and cabooses. 
2. The washing of exteriors of diesel cab windows, 
which consists of washing and wiping of walls and equip-
ment, mopping floors, vacuuming rugs, and removal of 
refuse and garbage. 
3. Checking heating, lighting and cooling systems in 
passenger cars. 
4. :Maintaining the charge on battery systems in pas-
senger cars. 
5. Lubricating of cars in transportation train serv-
ice, which service consists of inspection, maintaining 
waste levels and oiling car journal boxes. 
6. Stenciling baggage trucks and benches. 
7. Coopering and reclaiming grain doors. 
8. Cleaning, disinfecting and bedding stock cars. 
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Charges for the above mentioned services are sought 
to be taxed by the Commission as ''amounts paid or 
charged for all services for repairs or renovations of 
tangible personal property, or for installation of tangi-
ble personal property rendered in connection with other 
tangible personal property'' as provided in Section 
59-15-4(e), U.C.A. 1953. 
In order to determine whether or not the above 
enumerated services are taxable under Section 59-15-4(e), 
it becomes necessary to define what is meant by repairs, 
renovations or installations. 
Webster's International Dictionary, 2nd Ed. (1938), 
defines these terms as follows : 
1. Repairs. n. 
5. pl. Accounting, the sum total of renewals and 
replacements during a given period. 
1. Repair. n. 
1. Act or process of repairing; restoration to a 
sound or good state, after decay, dilapida-
tion, injury, loss, waste, etc. 
The same dictionary does not define ''renovations.'' 
It does define the verb "renovate" in the manner indi-
cated by plaintiff. In addition it states: 
Renovation. n. 
Act or process of renovating, or state of being 
renovated, renewed or revived. 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The verb" renovate" is defined: 
3. To renew, make over, or repair; to restore 
to freshness, purity, a sound state, newness of ap-
pearance, etc., as to reno ua.te draperies, or a house 
. . . (Emphasis supplied). 
In addition plaintiff cites several additional defini-
tions of these words as both verbs and nouns from the 
same dictionary. The Tax Commission does not dispute 
any of the definitions of actual terms in question. 
It is submitted, however, that these particular words 
have acquired new connotations in the ever-changing 
complexity of the English language since the 1938 date 
of that edition of the dictionary. In this regard, Web-
ster's Third New International Dictionary, 1961 edition, 
defines ''renovate'' : 
1. To restore to life, vigor activity; 2. To re-
store to a former state (as of freshness, sound-
ness, purity, or newness of appearance) ; make 
over. 
Repair: 
1 (a). The act or process of repairing; restora-
tion to a state of soundness, efficiency, or health; 
(b) An instance or result of repairing; 3. Repairs 
(pl.) The portion of maintenance charges expend-
ed to keep fixed assets in adequate and efficient 
operating condition and recorded on the books as 
expense - contrasted with renewal and replace-
ment.'' 
Under modern definitions, it would appear that: 
1. Services in cleaning passenger cars and cabooses 
would constitute a renovation under the definition as a 
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restoration to a former state of freshness, soundness or 
newness of appearance. Similarly, services of washing 
the exterior windows in the cabs of diesel units, cleaning 
interiors of dining cars, cleaning and washing train mark-
ers, and services in cleaning, sanding and disinfecting 
livestock cars would constitute a similar renovation under 
Utah statutes. 
Under the definition defining repairs as the act or 
process of repairing or restoration to a state of sound-
ness or efficiency, services rendered in testing and check-
ing heating, lighting and cooling systems and maintain-
ing the charge on battery systems, as well as services in 
lubricating cars in transportation service, would be 
repairs taxable under the Utah statute. 
Services in stenciling identification, loading grain 
doors, reclaiming or removing grain doors, adjusting 
shippers' ladings, stripping, or disconnecting cables and 
removing batteries from the dining car, would constitute 
installation services taxable under the Utah statutes. In 
addition, as the accounts included within the proposed 
sales tax deficiency assessment on services performed by 
the plaintiff on behalf of the Union Pacific and Southern 
Pacific Railroads during the period involved are charged 
on the books of the plaintiff as expenses and represent 
charges expended to keep fixed assets of the Union Pa-
cific and Southern Pacific in adequate and efficient oper-
ating condition, such charges are properly deemed 
"repairs" under the provisions of the Utah statutes, as 
defined by Webster's Third International Dictionary, 
1961 edition. 
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The following court decisions furnish further sup-
port for the Tax Commission's construction of these 
terms. 
''Repair'' commonly embraces not only restoration, 
but also renovation or renewal by any process of making 
good, strengthening, supplying or mending. "Repair" 
of interstate railway, constituting work in "interstate 
commerce,'' includes whatever may be necessary to keep 
subsisting railway, its structures, and equipment in safe 
state for interstate traffic, or to maintain and improve 
that state. Boyer v. Pewnsylvania R. Co., 162 Md. 328, 
159 A. 909, 911. 
"Repair" is work done on an existing structure or 
thing which has become imperfect by reason of action of 
elements or otherwise. Board of Ed. of City of Asbury 
Park v. Hock, 66 N. J. Super. 231, 168 A. 2d 829, 936. 
''Repair'' consists of correction of condition which 
has become defective because of injury or deterioration 
over a period of time and restores the original condition . 
.llasterson v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A. 2d '592, 598. 
In absence of any showing that the word ''repairs'' 
has a restricted meaning, in trade and commerce, it in-
cludes ''maintenance painting of a ship, since the words 
''maintain'' and ''maintenance'' are frequently used in 
the sense of keeping a thing in good condition by means 
of repairs. E. E. Kelly & Co., v. United States, 17 
C.C.P.A. 30, 32 (Customs). 
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The words ''maintain'' and ''repair'' practirally 
mean one and the same thing. Verdin v. City of St. Lo,uis, 
Mo., 27 S.W. 447, 451, 33 S.W. 480, 494. 
Under the same definitions cited by plaintiff, tlw 
Court in Tesche v. Best Concrete Products, Inc., 160 C.A. 
2d 256, 325 P. 2d 150, found "repair" to encompass cer-
tain cleaning operations, including the removal of cement 
which had adhered to a cement mixer. A California 
State Safety Order there required certain controls when 
the mixer was in use during repair work. 
POINT IV. 
COAL PURCHASED BY PLAINTIFF OUT OF 
THE STATE FOR USE AND CONSUMPTION 
IS SUBJECT TO USE TAX WHEN USED IN 
PROVIDING HEAT FOR OPERATING REV-
ENUE EQUIPMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S PAR-
ENT CORPORATIONS. 
Plaintiff purchased coal outside the State of Utah 
for use within the state in connection with the production 
of heat for the direct operation of Union Pacific and 
Southern Pacific Revenue equipment. 
As the coal was purchased and consumed by the 
plaintiff, it is subject to use tax under the provisions of 
Section 59-16-3, U.C.A. 1953, unless otherwise exempt. 
This section provides : 
''There is levied and imposed an excise tax on 
the storage, use or other consumption in this state 
of tangible personal property purchased for stor-
age, use or other consumption in this state at the 
rate of 2:Y2 % of the sales price of such property. 
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"~~~n·ry person storing, using or otherwise 
consuming in this state tangible personal property 
purchased shall be liable for the tax imposed by 
this act, and the liability shall not be extinguished 
until the tax has been paid to this state." 
Plaintiff correctly states the applicability of sales 
tax cx(lmptions to the use tax. Because of the rule of 
Gnu'l'a Steel Co. v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 
170, 209 P. 2d 208 ( 1949), the only sales of coal properly 
subject to use taxation are those provided by Section 
.->9-1r>-4(b), U.C.A. 1953, which states that a tax equiva-
lent to 2 11~ per cent of the amount paid: 
"(2) To any person as defined in this act in-
cluding municipal corporations for gas, electricity, 
heat, coal, fuel oil or other fuels sold or furnished 
for domestic or commercial consumption .... '' 
shall be collected and paid. 
The Tax Commission submits that consumption of 
coal so purchased by plaintiff herein clearly constitutes 
··commercial consumption'' within the meaning of the 
Utah statute. 
Coal sold for industrial consumption has been ex-
empt from Utah sales and use taxation since 1943. See 
rniou Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879. 
The imposition of a tax on ''commercial consump-
tion'' does not manifest an intention to tax energy sold 
for industrial consumption, and the word ''commercial'' 
is not intended to include all business activities. The 
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Commission agrees that the term ''commercial'' may 
have a broad or a narrow scope. The broad meaning 
encompasses all business, while the narrow sense includes 
only those enterprises buying or selling goods or services. 
See United States v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 
(C.C.A. Colo.), 143 F. 2d 79. 
The plaintiff cites the case of State ex rel. Kansas 
City Power & Light Co. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 75, 111 S.W. 
2d 513. There, electricity sold to a company to propel 
its cars over its streetcar system was determined not 
to be used for commercial purposes. 
Here, however, the sale of coal to plaintiff is for 
the production of heat for the Union Pacific and South-
ern Pacific Railroads, not for plaintiff's own use and 
benefit. 
Plaintiff receives benefits from the production of 
such heat. As it receives these benefits from services it 
provides to others, its consumption is hardly the same as 
that in State v. Smith, supra. 
Plaintiff's corporate survival depends upon its busi-
ness of providing service for others. It receives tangible 
benefits in return for such services. It is actively engaged 
in the commercial furnishing of services to its parent 
companies, and coal purchased and used for this pur-
pose is sold or furnished to plaintiff for commercial 
consumption. 
POINT V. 
THE DEPOSITING OF AN UNDERTAKING 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 59-15-16, U.C.A. 
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1953, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO 
APPEAL, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PAY-
MENT OF THE TAX HEREIN. 
Plaintiff asserts that by paying all taxes and inter-
est assessed by the Tax Commission it is relieved of 
further interest charges accruing after such undertaking 
is filed. 
The Tax Commission contends that the filing of 
~u('h an undertaking does not constitute a payment of 
taxes. The Commission does not have full use and con-
trol of amounts so paid because of the fact that should the 
taxpayer prevail the deposit must be refunded. 
Revenue collected from sales taxes is required by 
Section 59-15-21, U.C.A., to be deposited daily with the 
State Treasurer and credited to the state general fund. 
To construe an undertaking as payment of tax is to 
require the depositing of funds so paid in the general 
fund of the State of Utah. Such money is thereafter 
subject to distribution or appropriation to state purposes. 
Should the decision in this case require the return 
to the taxpayer of amounts deposited as an undertaking, 
the Tax Commission would then be powerless to effect a 
refund of monies so paid. And it is further possible that 
the funds could have been appropriated to some state 
purpose as to be unavailable for refund through other 
than legislative action. 
Payment implies the existence of a debt, of a party 
to whom it is owed, and of satisfaction of the debt to the 
party. Tuttle v. Armstead, 53 Conn. 175, 22 A. 677, 678. 
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As plaiintiff's appeal herein constitutes a denial of 
tax liability and as the Tax Commission's participation in 
this appeal constitutes a denial of satisfaction, it is ob-
vious that "payment" of the tax cannot be made until 
after this Court renders a decision on this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff sells tangible personal property within 
the State of Utah. It also performs taxable services. The 
fact that the market for these sales and services is rela-
tively limited cannot be determinative of whether or not 
they are taxable. Both sales and service are continuous 
and for the corporate benefit of the Depot Company. The 
only market for plaintiff's commercial activities is fully 
and adequately served thereby. 
For these reasons the Tax Commission urges that its 
decision be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General 
F. BURTON HOWARD, 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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